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RECENT BOOKS
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS THERAPY

Pierre Schlag*
LEE

BOLLINGER,**

THE

TOLERANT

SOCIETY,

295 pages,

$19.95 (Oxford University Press 1986).
Lee Bollinger's book presents a bold thesis: freedom of
speech rests not so much on the intrinsic or instrumental
value of speech as it does on a symbolic lesson to be learned
from the judicial enforcement of freedom of speech.' More
specifically, by depriving the community of the coercive legal
machinery to respond to speech that is extreme or offensive,
the courts teach a salutary lesson about the dark side of intolerance in social intercourse. This thesis, called the "Tolerance Theory," is grounded in the therapeutic model of
law: for Bollinger, freedom of speech should be viewed as a
type of social therapy.
The structure of Bollinger's book is straightforward.
First, he reviews the traditional theories of free speech. 2
These are depicted as internally contradictory and as unable
to answer some key questions for free speech theory. From
the cracks in the old theories, a new approach emerges: the

Tolerance Theory. Bollinger briefly tests this new theory
against the case law. He then recommends the judicial actualization of theory by means of a "conscientiously ambigu* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
B.A., Yale College, 1975; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1978.
I wish to thank Ron Collins, Tom Holdych, Vanessa Kearns, Grace Kirshner,
Deborah Maranville, Chris Rideout, David Skover, and Andy Walkover for their
help and comments on earlier drafts.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986).
2. In contrast to other works of free speech theory, Bollinger does not premise his discussion on the explicit or implicit premise that, of course, free speech is
wonderful-leaving us only to decide how and why.
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ous" doctrine. The book closes with some uncommonly
candid observations about the possible problems with Bollinger's own Tolerance Theory.
Bollinger's review of traditional free speech theory divides the prime candidates into two camps: the "classical
model" and the "fortress model." The classical model includes those theories which suggest that speech is protected
because of its instrumental or instrinsic value. Bollinger's
discussion of this model is mostly devoted to the search-fortruth conception and the political self-governance theory,3
though he does touch upon the self-realization theory.
While Bollinger finds some merit in these traditional theories, he nonetheless finds them wanting in some crucial
respects.
Much of Bollinger's criticism of these theories is classic
fare. 4 Still, he does have some new insights. Bollinger convincingly argues that these theories overestimate the value
of speech-acts which, if the hard truth be told, is often dispiritingly low. 5 Moreover, the traditional theories also tend
3. The search-for-truth conception is based on the view that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that trust is the only ground upon [which people's] wishes can safely
be carried out." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The political self-governance theory is based on the view that political speech (and maybe more) must be protected because it is essential to democratic self-governance. For different versions of this theory, compare A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948) with
BeVier, The First Amendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245. Also included in the classical model, but barely
discussed, is the "autonomy" or "self-realization" theory of freedom of speech.
According to this theory, speech is protected because it is an aspect of self-realization. See Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978).
4. See, e.g., Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 936-38 (1978); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
1212, 1232-39 (1983) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Economic Regulation]. Both pieces criticize the political self-governance theory advocated by Meiklejohn and Judge Bork,
respectively; see also Baker, supra note 3, at 967-90 (criticizing the marketplace-ofideas and search-for-truth theories).
5. The proponents of the search-for-truth and political self-governance
models, of course, could always answer that it is not the value of individual

speech-acts that matters, but rather the value at the margin of additional free
speech protection. Meanwhile, the proponents of the self-realization theory could
claim that what matters is not the social value of individual speech-acts, but the
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to underestimate the costs of speech. Not only may speech
persuade people to do socially undesirable acts or offend
those within earshot, but it can also harm the self-identity of
a community. Speech is "agenda-setting:" a speaker can
often command others to respond merely by saying something.6 By way of example, Bollinger notes that the attempts
of Nazis to march through Skokie, a suburb of Chicago
populated in part by survivors of Hitler's concentration
camps, imposed significant costs on the community. 7 The
mere proposal of the march required the community and its
Jewish constituency to respond and to divert their attention
8
from other matters.
Bollinger labels the second type of free speech theory
the "fortress model." According to this model, speech is
protected by a consciously overprotective doctrinal fortress
that serves to check the intrinsic tendencies of government
officials and the people to suppress speech that they disfavor. This type of theory, of course, does not aim to answer
why speech is protected, but rather seeks to justify the provalue to the individual of not having to constrain or conform her being to external
norms.
6. As Bollinger states:
The trouble with speech behavior, therefore, is that it very often
demands a response from those who know of it. It compels us to act
in response, and in that sense it exerts a controlling power over
other people's behavior. It is agenda-setting, for without any response, messages different from those we want to be communicated
are communicated.
L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 64.
7. Crudely summarized, the Skokie incidents centered on the attempts of a

Nazi party to hold marches in Skokie, a suburb of Chicago with a large Jewish
population that includes survivors of the German death camps. Skokie took vari-

ous legal measures to prevent the marches-all of which were legally unsuccessful. The facts of the Skokie incidents present starkly the psychological and
symbolic costs entailed by the rigorous protection of freedom of speech. For a
basic summary of the Skokie incidents, see L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 23-35.
See also D. DowNs, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); A. NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE

CASE, AND THE RISKS or FREEDOM (1979).
8. The proponents of the classical model could probably question whether
this agenda-setting feature of speech can truly be characterized as a cost. From
their perspective, the opportunity of individuals to command the community's attention by speech might be counted as a benefit. The proponents of the classical
model could also question Bollinger's causal supposition. Speech is agenda-setting only if the listeners take it seriously; therefore, listeners also have a role in
determining whether speech is agenda-setting or not.
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tection accorded speech of dubious social value, such as the
Nazi speech in Skokie.
Bollinger begins his criticism of the fortress model by
questioning the need for overprotection. He notes, for instance, that it would not be all that difficult to distinguish
valueless speech, such as Nazi noise, from valuable speech. 9
More significant is Bollinger's suggestion that the fortress
model adopts an image of the human condition that is at
odds with that advanced by the various versions of the classical model. The latter advances an essentially optimistic view
of humanity and its capacity for rational and sensible decision making. By contrast, the fortress model's elaborate
doctrinal safeguards are animated by a deeply pessimistic vi9. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 38. He states:
Given the premises or social reality offered in the Skokie opinions, it
is difficult to believe that some workable rule could not have been
arrived at for the speech at issue in that case. .

.

. Nor do I find it

difficult to distinguish in my own mind between the type of "offense"
caused by blacks marching in the South for their civil rights and that
brought about by Nazis who would advocate the murder or enslavement of a segment of the community.
Id. (emphasis added). I also have no difficulty in my own mind making these distinctions. However, the problem is not my mind nor Bollinger's mind: neither of
our minds needs to operate on the basis of doctrine. Rather the real problem is
whether either one of us could craft a piece of doctrine that would allow some
judge in some unknown part of the country to reach the right result in cases that
are much closer than the ones Bollinger presents above. Consider the following
list of speakers and the type of speech that they have produced:
The Nazis
The KKK
Louis Farrakhan
Jerry Falwell
Marx (On the Jewish Question, in K. MARX & F. ENGELS, COLLECTED
WORKS 148 (1975))
Frantz Fanon (WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963))
Lenny Bruce
Jesse Helms
Given this list, I think that it is difficult to come up with a piece of principled
doctrine that will lead some judge somewhere to reach "the right result" in deciding whose or which type of speech should be protected how much and when.
In support of this position, Bollinger cites Article 4 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which contains extensive
prohibitions against racist speech activities. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 253-54
n.66. This example only shows, however, that it is possible to craft doctrine. It
does not establish that it is possible to craft doctrine that works, much less that it
is possible to craft doctrine that would work in America.
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sion of the human animal as a captive of passion and
intolerance.
Bollinger presses hard on this pessimistic vision: he
wonders what possible value speech can have if the fortress
model is correct in its implicit assertion that we are not yet
out of the dark ages. Moreover, if this grim vision is correct,
it becomes difficult to maintain that the fortress of words will
hold fast once intolerance is loose across the land. The
short of it is: the classical and fortress models are at war with
each other and neither (alone or together) can account for
the questions that Bollinger believes free speech theory
must answer.
The first question Bollinger wants answered is why
there is such a disjunction in our attitudes towards personal
and legal responses to offensive speech. "When we compare
our reluctance to impose legal restraints against speech with
our readiness to employ a host of informal, or nonlegal, forms
of coercion against speech behavior, the paradox is striking."' 0 Bollinger also asks: "Why should we exercise such
extraordinary self-restraint in the regulation of nonspeech
behavior? Why, in particular, should we tolerate extremist
speech? Why should we vest the interpretative and enforcement functions of the principle in the judicial branch?""
Together, these questions serve to reorient theoretical attention away from the reasons for protecting speech and toward the reasons for restraining the legal suppression and
regulation of speech. Along with Bollinger's criticisms of
the classical and fortress models, these questions drive the
construction of his Tolerance Theory.
Less happily, the questions also signal a major tension
in Bollinger's book. In large part, Bollinger's review of the
intellectual history and theory of free speech follows a dialectical approach. Contradictions among the images, assumptions, implications, and effects of the various theories
are traced and highlighted. Counter-arguments and
counter-forces are acknowledged. Formalistic syntheses are
shunned. But then, mysteriously, the dialectic stops as Bollinger strives to formalize his insights into a grand normative
10. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 107, 140.
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free speech theory. 1 2 For reasons never quite made clear by
Bollinger, an account that begins on the dynamic plane and
which resists (at least in part) facile formalization nonetheless crystallizes into a static, normative theory offered for judicial adoption. Not only is this transformation mysterious,
but it is also hard to pull off. Indeed, once a dialectical inquiry is begun, it is not easy to arrest its workings. And at
the end of the book, after the Tolerance Theory has been
elaborated, the dialectic (true to form) returns to impeach
Bollinger's own theory (which accounts for those extraordinarily candid statements Bollinger makes in the last chapter
3
about the problems with his own theory).'
It is exceedingly difficult to move from a descriptive dialectic to a grand normative theory, unless of course, the
game is rigged in advance. And in some sense Bollinger has
done just that. From the outset, his dialectics are constrained by two significant theoretical and imagistic commitments. The first is a tendency to view law, including the free
speech clause, as symbolic discourse. Absent from Bollinger's account is a sense that the law is not mere theaterthat free speech involves real jobs, real blood, and real persons. The second commitment is his tendency to
subordinate speech to free speech theory. Bollinger attempts to resolve in theory problems that are best left to
speech itself to resolve, if at all. These tendencies, which are
objectionable in themselves, will return later to haunt Bollinger's Tolerance Theory. But both are already evident
early in Bollinger's work.
The first sign of Bollinger's tendency to view law as
symbolic discourse arises with his observation that we' 4 have
12. Bollinger's dialectical approach would have been much more conducive to
an argument cautioning against the adoption of any grand normative theory in the
free speech arena or an approach akin to the "eclectic" approach offered in Shiffrin, Economic Regulation, supra note 4, at 1232-39, or the approach offered in
Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157 (1980).
13. After advocating the idea that free speech should be designed to inculcate
the capacity for tolerance, Bollinger acknowledges some troublesome questions.
First, free speech protection might have the ironic effect of stimulating excess
intolerance in other social contexts. Second, the promotion of tolerance might be
too successful and lead to obedience. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 245-47.
14. Bollinger relies frequently on the first person plural. It is very difficult to
determine who Bollinger thinks "we" are. See infra text accompanying notes
26-27. For the sake of fidelity to Bollinger's work, I use this first person plural
too-but I have substantial doubts that this "we" exists in any meaningful sense.
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disjunctive attitudes toward private and legal condemnation
of speech that we do not like. Bollinger illustrates this disjunction by noting that if someone makes a racially derogatory remark, we will probably insist upon a sort of censure
(such as ridicule, reproach, or humiliation), and we will feel
guilty if no censure occurs.' 5 But as soon as someone proposes that there ought to be a law forbidding the offensive
speech, the free speech principle will be invoked and the
proposal abandoned. Bollinger finds a curious disjunction
here. 16

But the disjunction is only present (and only calls for
explanation) if we find that the two situations are analogous.
Arguably, they are not. Heaping ridicule or dispensing large
doses of humiliation upon a racist is not entirely the same
thing as putting him in jail. To be sure, there are communicative or symbolic aspects to putting someone in jail. And
both humiliation and jail terms have a tendency to restrict
the interpretive possibilities of the person submitted to the
treatment. But quite frankly, jail restricts social possibilities
in a way that humiliation and ridicule generally do not.' 7
15. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 12.
16. Of course, the disjunction disappears if Bollinger's factual premise is
wrong. And indeed, it is doubtful that the general populace feels inhibited from
using legal measures to contain offensive or extremist speech. It can also be
doubted that the lay public feels inhibited by state action doctrine from making
"free speech" arguments in "private" contexts, such as the workplace or other
institutional settings.
The legal community is divided as well on this question, as is manifested by
the depth of controversy surrounding the state action doctrine. For recent proposals to eliminate the state action doctrine, see Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503 (1986); Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State
Action" Doctrine: A FundamentalRight to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221
(1985). More generally, the plausibility, usefulness, and legitimacy of the public/private distinction is under question as well. A Symposium: The Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
17. This is not universally true. Humiliation and ridicule can be so concerted
and so systematic that they have largely the same effect or implications as do legal
penalties. The cultural practice of racism and sexism, for instance, are clear examples. To the extent that these practices are systematic, concrete, and inescapable, they can yield the same effects and implications as racism and sexism of
the legal, official kind.
Yet there is a sense in which criminal or civil penalties generally have an effect
in restricting social possibilities above and beyond the symbolic level. The same
is not true of informal speech sanctions such as ridicule or humiliation. When the
government puts people in jail or compels them to pay fines, it is arguably doing
something more than merely speaking. Whether ridicule or humiliation is merely
speaking or something more, by contrast, depends on the context and on whether
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Why then does Bollinger see such an "extraordinary
disjunction" in our attitudes regarding private and legal responses to offensive speech?18 The short answer is that Bollinger thinks that private expressions of reproach or
humiliation are essentially similar to legal condemnation.
But why would he think that? The answer can be found in
his vision of law as symbolic discourse: "Law plays a special
role in this country. It provides a process through which we
create a social identity, by which we reflect and embody the
aspirations and values of the community. Enforcement of
the law bespeaks a commitment to those aspirations and values."' 19 As a descriptive matter, Bollinger is undoubtedly
correct in claiming that law is a type of expression, a way for
the community (or rather, particular constituencies) to
speak. But it is also true that law speaks with an authority
and a violence not common to other types of literature.
Largely absent from Bollinger's account is the recognition
that law is not merely discourse and symbol, but power and
tool as well.
Perhaps more serious is Bollinger's genuine fondness
for the idea that the community can express its sentiments
and sense of identity through law:
We suffer a serious loss when we strip ourselves of the
use of legal restraints against speech behavior we regard
as socially destructive. It is easier to organize an official
response through the lawmaking process ....But its pri-

mary value for us is as a communicative tool for satisfying
the need of the community to express its position on the
issues raised 20by the speaker and in doing so to define and
create itself.
This vision of law can be dangerous: Bollinger appears to be
glorifying the state's role in defining the meaning, identity,
and values of the community.
the humiliation or ridicule is sufficiently systematic, concerted, and complete so

that we can say that it operates in roughly the same manner as a law.
This points to another weakness in Bollinger's observation. Sometimes we
are every bit as concerned with the private disruption of speech as we are with
state repression of speech. The unreflective restriction of the realm of discourse
produced by institutional or cultural convention or by powerful figures draws
fierce claims that freedom of speech is being abridged. Indeed, it is common for
lay people, who are not encumbered by state action doctrine, to appeal to the first
amendment in "private" institutional settings.
18. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1,at 35.
19. Id. at 72.
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Ironically, while Bollinger accords significant status to
law as a form of symbolic discourse, he tends to truncate the
symbolic dimensions of speech itself. This brings us to the
second problematic tendency in Bollinger's work. He often
seems to resolve as a matter of theory problems that should
probably be left to speech itself. As will be seen, this tendency is manifest in the Tolerance Theory, but it is already
nascent in Bollinger's early introduction of a dichotomy between extreme and nonextreme speech and in his persistent
questioning of the value of the former.21 Bollinger's establishment of this distinction in the formative stages of his theory leads to a devaluation of extremist speech. Indeed, he
quite clearly thinks that extremist speech needs some special
defense under the free speech clause. In part, however, that
supposition stems from the rapid link he makes between extremist speech and the Nazi incidents in Skokie. The latter
events serve as Bollinger's main image of extremist speech
and are used throughout the book as a motif for testing theoretical insights.
The very dominance of the Skokie imagery in Bollinger's book invites a certain amount of chiding: one could say
that Bollinger has developed a grand theory to resolve a single incident-one which is already history. But chiding
aside, there is something to be said for this criticism. It is by
no means clear that extremist speech is a particularly perplexing, significant, or microcosmic issue for free speech
theory in general. 22 Likewise, it hardly seems evident that
the Nazis are a particularly representative or useful vehicle
for discussing extremist speech.2 3 Further, many things can
21. Bollinger's questioning of extremist speech begins in the introduction.
Id. at 9.
22. Even from Bollinger's perspective that free speech should be seen as
shaping the intellectual character of society, one would think that television and
commercial advertising present much more significant terrain for inquiry than the
infrequent and marginal displays of extremist groups such as the Nazis.
23. Nazi speech presents some unique considerations. Given the meaning of
the Holocaust in our culture, the identity of a speaker as a Nazi has often had
more bearing on the meaning of the speech than its actual content. In a sense, it
almost does not matter what a Nazi says; as long as he is identified as a Nazi, his
speech will almost always carry the same revolting meaning. Indeed, this point is
illustrated in the Skokie incidents:
Was this a march to proclaim religious and racial hatred, or even
genocide? No, said the Nazis quite explicitly from the beginning. It
was to protest the denial of their "free speech rights." The placards
they proposed to carry were to be inscribed with the words, White
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be said about Nazi speech other than the fact that it is extreme. For instance, the Nazi speech in Skokie can be seen
as posing the problem of: racial slurs or insults, psychotic
noise, provocation to violence, vocal invocation of deep
seated conventions of religious or ethnic prejudice, offensive
speech, psychic harm, and so on. The point is that Bollinger's choice to describe the Nazi speech in Skokie as extreme
decides too much-both with respect to the Nazis and with
respect to extreme speech. There are other ways to describe
Nazi speech and many other images of extremist speech besides the Nazis. The choice of description and imagery
seems to be a deeply political question. Moreover, the very
choice to divide speech into the camps of extreme and
nonextreme seems transparently political. 24 And yet Bollin25
ger has not given any political arguments for his choices.
What, then, is the basis for his positions?
The answer is that Bollinger has adopted a therapeutic
model to resolve free speech problems. Once this is recognized, the general absence of explicit political argument in
Bollinger's work becomes understandable (even if not justifiable). Indeed, there is no need to talk about politics once
the problem is depicted as a society-wide sickness or malady.
And argument is unneccessary, because the therapist can
rely on the rhetoric of authority and expertise. 26 Following
the therapeutic model, Bollinger examines society, assesses
its ailment, and describes the role that speech and freedom
Free Speech and Free Speech for White America, a protest against
the demands for an insurance policy as a prerequisite to obtaining a
march permit.
L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 27.
24. Particularly objectionable is Bollinger's failure to define extremist speech
while relying heavily on the Nazi imagery to supply content for that term. What
are we supposed to conclude from this besides the view that all extreme speech is
awful because it is like Nazi speech? Or is Bollinger's vision of extremist speech
truly limited to white-power hate groups? If it is, then it truly stretches the imagination to think that toleration of extremist speech is a central problem for free
speech theory.

25. The absence of political argument is also evidenced in Bollinger's failure
to justify his choice of intolerance as the dark impulse most in need of containment by free speech. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
26. Indeed, therapeutic approaches often have, though not necessarily, a tendency to depoliticize. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32
STAN. L. REv 487 (1980). Missing from Bollinger's account is a sense that people

disagree for reasons that have little to do with intolerance and that probably cannot and should not be cured by therapy.
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of speech might play in the therapy. But who wants therapy,
let alone national collective therapy under the tutelage of
the U.S. Supreme Court?
Bollinger's answer is that we do. In fact, a significant
portion of his book discusses what we feel, what we think, and
what we believe. I do not want to make too much of Bollinger's frequent use of the first person plural: it is an accepted
stylistic device. But in Bollinger's book, this stylistic device
has a close connection with the substance of his message. I
often wondered who this "we" might be? The American
public? (Very doubtful.) The legal community? (Again,
doubtful.) Legal intellectuals with a penchant for theory?
(Yes, now this one is possible.) But does it matter what such
a small idiosyncratic community believes? Besides, is this
community really a "we" or more like a You/I/They/It?
Even if this "we" exists, do (we) have the right to impose
collective therapy on them-the American public?
Bollinger clearly thinks so: "Law (in this case, constitutional law) is being used . . . as a major project concerned
with nothing less than helping to shape the intellectual character of the society." 27 This brings us to the Tolerance
Theory:
Taking this approach, we can now see that the purposes
of the free speech enterprise may reasonably include not
only the "protection" of a category of especially worthy
human activity but also the choice to exercise extraordinary self-restraint toward behavior acknowledged to be
bad but that can evoke feelings that lead us to behave in
ways we must learn to temper and control. What is important about speech is not that it is special but that the
excessive intolerance we sometimes experience toward it
is both problematic and typical, in the sense of reflecting
a general tendency of mind that can potentially affect
many forms of social intercourse.2 8
This novel thesis reverses much of contemporary thought
about free speech.
Bollinger argues that the current social function of free
speech is to teach us something about our problematic inclinations to intolerance. We are to use the free speech principle as an opportunity to explore the irrational dark side of
human beings that manifests itself as intolerance. By con27.

L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 107 (emphasis in original).

28. Id. at 120.
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fronting this dark impulse, we are to learn how to master it.
We are to learn how, when, and why we should exercise restraint, or, more pessimistically, self-repression. So the first
reversal is that the free speech clause is supposed to lead us
29
not toward more or greater expression, but rather to less.

The second reversal offered by Bollinger is that the normative justification for free speech rests not so much on the
values supporting free speech as it does on what we might
learn or become by restraining legal reponses to speech that
we do not like. But why this lesson? Of all the dark impulses thought to animate human beings, why is intolerance
the one most in need of containment by the free speech
principle?3o

If free speech is to be used as therapy to cure destructive impulses, the choice of possible applications is wide
open. One could even argue that freedom of speech should
be construed to teach us something about the dark side of
tolerance-those irrational tendencies which we call passivity, resignation, and apathy. 31 As long as we are using free
speech to teach lessons, why not use the concept and its rhetorical baggage as a symbolic spur to involvement, creativity,
or experimentation?3 2 Free speech could be conceived as a
29. Or at the very least, we must learn to stifle ourselves before intolerant
words trip off the tongue.
30. And similarly, why limit the Tolerance Theory to the interpretation of free
speech? Why not extend the theory to equal protection or substantive due process? Bollinger's answer to these questions seems to be that speech generally
causes less injury than nonspeech behavior. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 124.
The point seems to be that it is less harmful to teach the vices of intolerance by
allowing offensive speech than by creating, for example, more costly entitlements
under equal protection or substantive due process.
31. E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941); Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81-123
(1969) (suggesting that the objective of tolerance calls for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, and opinions and that the actual practice of tolerance is
a passive acceptance of an entrenched false consciousness). Bollinger attempts to
distinguish tolerance from its dark side, which he calls "obedience," but the distinction is awfully thin-theoretically and practically. "[F]ree speech s concerned
with the development of a mind that is itself comfortable with uncertainty and
complexity. The obedient mind does not think for itself." L. BOLLINGER, supra
note 1, at 246-47. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Bollinger never
gives us a terribly cogent account of what he means by tolerance. See id. at 10
(tolerance is a capacity to control feelings or to show understanding and leniency
for conduct or ideas conflicting with one's own).
32. Certainly, this thesis would be more in keeping with the traditional rhetoric accompanying freedom of speech than the Tolerance Theory.
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unique sphere where people are allowed to be intolerant/destabilizing, upsetting/creative, foolish/experimental.
The point is simply this: Bollinger may be right that we
suffer from destructive impulses toward intolerance, but we
also suffer from noxious irrational impulses toward tolerance and from many other submerged impulses that
threaten social intercourse and cause pain. Why then is intolerance to be accorded primary status as the one dark im33
pulse most deserving of therapy?
I suspect that the answer may have something to do
with intolerance itself-specifically, the intolerance of a certain kind of intellectual project. Many intellectuals have a
highly pronounced distaste for intolerance because it is the
ugly and threatening reminder that social life is not all contemplation, reason, and dialogue. 3 4 Intolerance threatens
both the significance and the possibility of many an intellectual project. Now, it is certainly to Bollinger's credit to
champion the cause of tolerance (and the cause of intellectuals). But is there not a bit of intolerance in commandeering
the whole of the free speech clause to domesticate this particular intellectual bete noire?3 5 This strikes me as a rather parochial interpretation of freedom of speech. And a rather
33. Bollinger's arguments on this score are fairly weak. He suggests that tolerance is a necessary adjunct of democratic government in which compromise and
defeat are inevitable, that a capitalist system requires a broad capacity for selfcontainment, and that pervasive bureaucratic and professional systems require the
ability to submerge the self. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 117-18, 141, 238-39.
The structure of Bollinger's argument goes something like this:
1. This is the way our community is constituted.
2. In order for our community to function as presently constituted,
tolerance is necessary.
3. Therefore, we ought to promote tolerance through available
means, including the free speech clause.
Missing from Bollinger's account is any critical examination of how our community is or should be constituted. Bollinger simply takes the community as given
and resists any political inquiry into its nature. More troubling still, he does not
even employ his own psychological or therapeutic approach to question the way
the community is constituted.
34. Foi other intellectuals, of course, the problem is just the reverse: the intellectual project is threatened by the passive tolerance of routinized procedures
and conventions that preclude inquiry and extinguish thought. See Schlag, The
Brilliant, the Curious and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV.- (1987) (forthcoming). So
which is most threatening to the intellectual project: tolerance or intolerance? It
is often difficult to decide which is worse and even sometimes to decide which is
which.
35. Bollinger clearly means to use the free speech clause to convert others to
his vision of the intellectual project. In a previous essay, he wrote:
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strained one as well: given that intellectualism is such a marginal idiosyncratic project, it would seem difficult to impose
it on the entire nation through the medium of law-especially if it has to be done in the name of tolerance.
It is deeply wrong, though common enough, for legal
academics to assume that the law has to be tailored to fit
some version of the intellectual project. 36 There is not only
intolerance in such a vision, but a potential for a good deal
of violence as well. 37 I certainly would not mind if Ameri-

cans were more in the intellectual image, but the free speech
clause hardly seems a legitimate or effective vehicle for ac8
complishing this end.3

In part, Bollinger's cooptation of free speech to advance
his version of the intellectual project stems from his view of
law as symbolic discourse. Of course, to a large extent Bollinger is right: law is symbolic. And in the academic context
of the law school, law rarely moves beyond the symbolic. In
practice, however, those legal symbols have a tendency to
crash through people's lives as husbands are put in jail,
wives are fired from jobs, and sons are beaten over the head
with nightsticks. Suppose then that a court following the
Tolerance Theory announced to someone like Paul Cohen
that his case simply does not provide the right setting to test
I will suggest that much of what we encounter in discourse
about the First Amendment is really about fundamental intellectual
values. Free speech is not just about getting more information and
ideas needed to make good decisions, nor just about having freedom
to express ourselves as we see fit, but more importantly, and more
broadly, about how to think, about such matters as our beliefs and
about the fears and angers we bear towards the contrary beliefs and
behavior of others.
Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 445 (1983) (emphasis
in original).
36. The whole program can be summarized as making law safe and attractive
for a certain kind of legal intellectual. As normative programs for the construction of law go, this one seems neither realistic nor attractive.
37. See E. CANNETrI, AUTO-DA-FE (1979); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
LJ. 1601, 1610-18 (1986).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 38-49. I think that the prospect of
transforming America into an intellectual community ranks somewhere between
zero and nonexistent. As for making it a more intellectual community, the
chances rise to the level of dismal. As for using the free speech clause to inculcate
intellectual values of tolerance, the chances return to zero.
A modicum of realism is warranted here. Below I have listed the circulation
figures for a number of magazines along with my subjective assessment of the
level of consciousness associated with each magazine.
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the limits of tolerance. 39 I think there is a good chance the
response would be mildly intolerant. And conversely, can
you imagine telling Jewish survivors of the concentration
camps that the major (the only?) reason the Nazis must be
allowed to march is to enable the Jews and the rest of the
community to learn the virtues of tolerance?4o I cannot conMAGAZINE

CIRCULATION

CONSCIOUSNESS

New York Review of
Books

120,000

modernist/postmodernist

The New Republic

90,000

modernist/post-Cartesian

Time Magazine

4,600,000

Cartesian

People

2,840,776

Pre-Cartesian

Reader's Digest

17,884,818

?

Star

3,757,065

?

National Enquirer

4,057,055

?

The circulation statistics are drawn from ULRICH'S INTERNATIONAL PERIODICALS
DIRECTORY (25th ed. 1986-87). Obviously, I have compiled this data, rather unscientifically, to make a point. Still, if we suppose that this data on circulation is
some indication of the prevailing levels of consciousness in America, then what
chance is there in using the free speech clause to teach the virtues of tolerance?
Who is likely to receive, let alone understand, Bollinger's message-especially
given its complexity and the source from which it will issue? See infra text accompanying note 42.
39. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The trial court convicted Mr.
Cohen under a disturbing-the-peace statute for wearing a jacket that bore the inscription "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse. The United States Supreme Court
found the conviction unconstitutional. Id. at 26.
I do not mean to suggest that Bollinger's approach would counsel against
finding a constitutional violation in this case. It could be argued either way under
his "conscientiously ambiguous" doctrine. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 203-04
(discussing Cohen v. California); see infra text accompanying notes 44-48. The
point is, however, that quite a few free speech claimants (and their audience)
would probably react with no small amount of intolerance if they learned that
their speech was left unprotected because protection would not serve to inculcate
the virtues of tolerance.
40. Bollinger does adjudicate the Skokie incidents in his book. He concludes
that, on balance, the Nazis should have been allowed to march. L. BOLLINGER,
supra note 1, at 197-200. Interestingly, Bollinger reaches this conclusion not on
the grounds that allowing the march would allow people to learn about the dark
side of intolerance, but rather on the grounds that free speech analysis begins
"with a strong presumption in favor of toleration." Id. at 197. This bit of proposed doctrine is quite different from the Tolerance Theory. Almost any free
speech theorist would be capable of making this statement. There are many reasons to favor toleration other than the Tolerance Theory: the marketplace of
ideas, political self-governance, and self-realization. Bollinger's presumption is
not very different from saying, "when we deal with speech, there is a strong presumption that it is protected."
It is this presumption and not the Tolerance Theory that allows Bollinger to
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ceive of a court having the moral authority to make such
4
statements. '
I am not suggesting that it is wrong to focus on the symbolic aspects of free speech, but Bollinger overdoes it. Law
is both symbol and instrument. To disregard the crude,
causal, or instrumental aspects of law leads to two kinds of
violence. The first type of violence is committed by courts
when they manipulate symbols without the slightest consideration of the earthly effects those symbols will produce.
The tendency to view law as merely or primarily symbolic
discourse leads to the second kind of violence-the untutored response of the public to the first kind of violence.
It is easy for legal academics to fall for the first kind of
violence because it can be shrouded in some very noble visions, for instance, the view of the court as the forum of
principled argument, or the view of adjudication as dialogue. Bollinger does seem taken with this kind of vision
when he states that "[I]itigation provides the framework, the
occasion, for the community to think about the things free
speech is intended to raise for thought." 42 This is an exceedingly romantic vision of litigation. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine a more challenging forum than litigation for
teaching the virtues of tolerance. Not only is litigation
starkly outcome-oriented, but it is fraught with displays of
intransigence, hyperbole, and general pettiness. And before
one can reach "the forum of principled argument," there are
sustained encounters with the stylized vagaries of evidence
law, the uncertain recollections of witnesses, and the viscissitudes of civil procedure. As for the view of "adjudication as
dialogue," there may be more to be said for the view that the
latter ends when the former begins. Additionally, if litigaconclude that the courts reached the correct conclusion in Skokie. The presumption is not theory-specific and yet it is crucial for Bollinger's conclusion. Bollinger's analysis of Skokie is simply not based on any characteristic that is unique or
specific to his own theory. Had he deployed his own theory to decide Skokienamely the therapeutic model-his treatment of the issues would have been implausible, as the next footnote suggests.
41. To explain in a judicial opinion why the Nazis must be allowed to march
in Skokie is surely no easy task. But for a judge to explain to the Jewish and nonJewish residents of Skokie that it is because they and the nation need to learn the
virtues of tolerance would bespeak an incredible degree of arrogance. Confronted with such an opinion, I think that any number of people would be (and
would be quite justified in being) furious-and that is a far cry from tolerance.
42. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 195.
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tion is to serve as collective therapy, it seems appropriate to
consider how well the lay public follows and understands litigation. How many Americans could tell you today what the
Skokie cases were all about? How well would the present
citizens of Skokie answer the question?
Moreover, if free speech is to provide therapeutic lessons on the vices of intolerance, it would be nice to know
what we are supposed to learn. Bollinger never makes this
sufficiently clear. One interpretation would suggest that we
are supposed to learn how problematic the human condition
is: we are to see ourselves as controlled by irrational impulses to intolerance, learn to control these impulses while
remaining competent and whole enough to express intolerance when it is warranted.
As a prescription for the good life, this is nothing short
of admirable. At the very least, it should strike a chord with
academic intellectuals who traffic in this problem day in and
day out. But it is the free speech clause at stake here. Is it
conceivable that it should be reduced to experimental therapy aimed at curing or illuminating the human propensity
toward intolerance? Are legislators, administrators, and the
rest of officialdom merely to watch the therapy from the
sidelines, leaving the rest of us to hope that the message
rubs off on them too? 43
Are free speech entitlements, and the jobs, security, and
bodily integrity that go along with them, really supposed to
be subordinated to the claim of symbolic discourse that it
has something to teach about the dark side of intolerance?
And what about this little matter of fashioning legal rules
and doctrine for deciding actual cases? Bollinger has an answer to these questions: the key is to develop a "conscien43. There is little doubt that Bollinger conceives the free speech clause on the
therapeutic model. This raises the question of whether Bollinger has adopted the
right sort of therapy given his diagnosis of the ailment. There are, after all, many
conflicting types of therapy: Psychoanalytic Therapy (S. FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (1955); S.FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1949)); Existential Therapy (I. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980); R. MAY, FREEDOM
AND DESTINY (1981)); Behavioral Therapy (A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION (1969); B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971)); Rational-Emotive Therapy (A. ELLIS & R. GRIEGER, HANDBOOK OF RATIONAL-EMoTIVE THERAPY (1977));
Reichian Therapy (W. REICH, THE INVASION OF
COMPULSORY SEX-MORALITY (1971); W. REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM
(1970)). Which of these approaches can most easily or successfully be adapted to
curing the problem of intolerance?
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tiously ambiguous" doctrine that takes into account the
tolerance function of free speech and the social costs that
free speech imposes. 44 But the balancing Bollinger offers
does not work.
First, he asks us to balance incommensurables: the effectiveness of a therapeutic free speech session (discounted
by its lack of effectiveness) as against social cost (discounted
by its improbability). 45 We simply do not have a scale that
will accommodate the realm of symbolic discourse on one
side and the world of social costs on the other.
Second, balancing does not help because the world depicted by Bollinger removes the possibility of making the
means-to-ends judgments that would allow balancing in the
first place. Indeed, Bollinger acknowledges some alarming
Catch 22's in balancing our way to tolerance. First, "the actual operation of free speech might have the ironic effect result of stimulating excessive intolerance elsewhere in
society." 46 Second, "[f]ree speech may be too successful and
create a problem of excessive tolerance, which may have
equally pernicious effects for the society as its opposing
vice." 47 If the world of symbolic effects is this perverse (and
I am tempted to agree with Bollinger that it is), then balancing and the Tolerance Theory are hardly up to the tasks they
face.
Finally, Bollinger's balancing does not work because
when the stakes are high and the courts have to choose between imposing some concrete societal costs or providing an
opportunity for an abstract lesson about our dark side, the
balance is likely to tip against speech. Ultimately, following
Bollinger's approach may well lead the courts to conclude
that it is best not to insist too much on freedom of speech44. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 192.
45. For instance, in dealing with the Skokie incidents, Bollinger states:
We begin, under the tolerance principle of free speech, with an understood commitment to extraordinary self-restraint; coupled,
therefore, with a willingness to be sensitive to context is the idea the

free speech principle requires us to begin with a strong presumption
in favor of toleration, which can be overcome only after it is determined that the society has little or nothing to gain in the various
ways that the tolerance principle proposes the society will benefit

from self-restraint and by comparison, a great deal to lose.
note 1, at 197.
46. Id. at 244.
47. Id.at 245 (emphasis in original).

L. BOLLINGER, supra
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only as much as is necessary to teach the lesson that insis48
tence is sometimes a vice.
CONCLUSION

Obviously, I think there are serious problems with the
Tolerance Theory. Not the least among them is that beneath Bollinger's message of tolerance there lurks a fair degree of intolerance. Ironically, this observation might
suggest that I do believe in the virtue of tolerance after all.
But I do not: the tolerance/intolerance distinction is intellectually useless unless we know which is which. And we
cannot know which is which unless we know what it is we are
supposedly being tolerant or intolerant about.

48. As Bollinger states:
The simple truth about free speech is, therefore, that its proponents face the risk of exhibiting precisely the intolerant mind that
the principle is intended to point up and condemn. An intolerant
defense of tolerance is more than just an anomaly; it may cancel out,
even reverse, the gains the society hopes to achieve through the institution of free speech. We must teach ourselves therefore, that the
pursuit of tolerance is not necessarily an inoculation against the malady of an intolerant mind.
Id. at 215.

